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Hailed as the "great writ of liberty, " the writ of habeas corpus protects the Ameri-
can citizenry from arbitrary and wrongful governmental imprisonment. The scope of
the protection provided by the writ, however, has never been finally settled during its
almost 200 year existence. This is the result of afailure on the part of those analyzing
its scope to recognize the complexity of the issues involved and to confront the true
issues that underlie its application. In this Article, Professor Chemerinsky discusses
what he considers to be the four primary considerations of habeas issues; federalism,
separation ofpowers, the purposes of the criminal justice system, and the nature ofthe
litigation involved. In order to promote continuing dialogue on the habeas doctrine,
he provides his views on how these issues should be analyzed in the habeas context.
INTRODUCTION
BLACKSTONE REFERRED TO the writ of habeas corpus as
"the most celebrated writ in the English law."' Mindful of its
importance in English jurisprudence, the Framers of the United
States Constitution explicitly provided that "The Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended unless when in Cases
of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."' Con-
gress, in adopting the first Judiciary Act, authorized federal courts
to "grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may
be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the Constitution, or
of any treaty or law of the United States."3 Although initially fed-
eral courts could only grant habeas corpus to prisoners in federal
custody, after the Civil War Congress allowed state prisoners to ob-
tain habeas corpus if they were held "in custody in violation of the
* Associate Professor, University of Southern California Law Center; B.S., North-
western (1975); J.D., Harvard (1978). I want to thank Jeffrey Golden and Mel Ilomin for
their excellent research assistance.
1. 3 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 129 (1791). For an excellent history of habeas
corpus, see W. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS (1980). See also
Rosenn, The Great Writ-A Reflection of Societal Change, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 337 (1983). The
focus of this paper is solely on habeas corpus in federal courts and on the most familiar form
of the habeas writ, traditionally titled, habeas corpus ad subjiciendum. R. SOKOL, FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS 35 (2d ed. 1969).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
3. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
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Constitution or laws of the United States." 4
The writ of habeas corpus provides individuals with protection
against arbitrary and wrongful imprisonment. It is not surprising,
therefore, that habeas corpus has long been viewed as the "great
writ of liberty."5 It truly is one of the most, if not the single most,
important part of the Constitution which protects individual rights.
Yet, even after almost 200 years of habeas corpus litigation in
the United States, including more than 100 years under the Recon-
struction statutes that made the writ available to state prisoners,
there remains great disagreement over the circumstances under
which habeas corpus should be available. Scarcely a year goes by
without several major Supreme Court cases dealing with the scope
of habeas corpus relief.6 Perhaps the area where the Burger Court
most dramatically departed from the Warren Court precedents was
in the area of habeas corpus.7 Additionally, the Reagan Adminis-
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982).
5. W. DUKER, supra note 1, at 3.
6. In the 1985-86 Term, for example, the Court decided several major cases dealing
with habeas corpus. See Vasquez v. Hillary, 106 S. Ct. 617 (1986) (district court order al-
lowing supplementation of record does not violate rule requiring exhaustion in habeas cases;
passage of time does not prevent habeas petition based on racial exclusions of grand jurors);
Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986) (deficiency of state fact-finding procedure re-
quires hearing de novo in federal court on question of defendant's possible mental disorder);
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. 2616, 2627 (1986) (concurring opinion of four Justices con-
cluding that "'the ends of justice' require federal courts to entertain such petitions only
where the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual
innocence."); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 106 S. Ct. 2574 (1986) (defendant may present on
habeas corpus claim that because of ineffective assistance of counsel illegally obtained evi-
dence was not challenged during state trial); Murray v. Carrier, 106 S. Ct. 2639 (1986) (de-
fendant may not raise on habeas corpus challenge to state court conviction based on
procedural errors that were not raised during the initial trial, even though the failure to object
was a result of the attorney's inadvertence and not a deliberate decision); Smith v. Murray,
106 S. Ct. 2661, 2668 (1986) (failure to object to procedural errors during state court trials
prevents raising of objections on habeas corpus absent a "substantial claim that the alleged
error undermined the accuracy of the guilt or sentencing determination.").
7. Nichol, Backing into the Future: The Burger Court and the Federal Forum, 30 U.
KAN. L. REv. 341, 356 (1982) ("In no other area of jurisprudence is the Court's approach
more diametrically opposed to that of its predecessor.").
I recognize that separating analysis into the Warren and Burger eras is somewhat mis-
leading. Many of the same Justices served on the Court under each of these Chief Justices.
Additionally, the cases do not always neatly divide between the eras. Some of the cases
expanding the role of the federal courts in protecting constitutional rights were decided
before and after the Warren Court. See, eg., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (all consti-
tutional claims may be relitigated on habeas); Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982)
(no exhaustion requirement in constitutional cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Additionally, it
is quite likely that the Burger Court's views of habeas corpus are likely to continue during the
Rehnquist Court, at least until there are additional changes in the Court's membership.
Nonetheless, it seems appropriate to compare the Warren and Burger Courts with regard
to habeas corpus. As described in detail below, see infra text accompanying notes 45-77,
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tration has sponsored several controversial bills in Congress seeking
to further limit the availability of habeas corpus. 8
Conservatives view habeas corpus as the vehicle that guilty peo-
ple use to escape convictions and sentences.9 They emphasize the
importance of finality and urge limiting the availability of habeas
corpus to those who can make a colorable showing of their inno-
cence.1" Liberals see habeas corpus as an essential protection
against individuals being held in violation of the Constitution and
laws of the United States." They argue that habeas corpus does not
exist solely to free innocents who were wrongfully convicted; it
serves to assure that no person is imprisoned because of an infringe-
ment of his or her constitutional rights. t2
Is it possible to bridge this fundamental disagreement? If soci-
ety were to start all over again with a blank slate and attempt to
define the availability of habeas corpus, how should it go about do-
ing so? In this Article, I suggest that the issues involved in deciding
the scope of habeas corpus are far more complex than is usually
there was a major difference between these two Courts in their habeas doctrines and their
underlying views of habeas corpus. As such, comparison of the two Courts is revealing both
in understanding the development of habeas law and as a convenient way of identifying and
contrasting two very different approaches to the subject.
8. See, e.g., S. 2903, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); Hearings on S. 653 Before the Sub-
committee on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1981)
(testimony of Jonathan Rose presenting position of Reagan Administration). See Yackle,
The Reagan Administration's Habeas Corpus Proposals, 68 IOWA L. REV. 609 (1983).
9. See, e.g., Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack o, Criminal Judg-
ments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970) (arguing limit of habeas corpus to cases where there is
a colorable showing of innocence); Weick, Apportionment of the Judicial Resources in Crimi-
nal Cases: Should Habeas Corpus be Eliminated?, 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 740 (1972) (advanc-
ing proposals to restrict the availability of habeas corpus).
10. The Burger Court repeatedly emphasized that habeas corpus undermines finality
and releases the guilty. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127-28 (1982) (habeas corpus
"undermines the usual principles of finality of litigation," "degrades" the trial, and "cost[s]
society the ability to punish admitted offenders."); Smith v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. 2661, 2668
(1986) ("profound societal costs that attend the exercise of habeas jurisdiction" justify enforc-
ing procedural default rules in the absence of any "substantial claim that the alleged error
undermined the accuracy of the guilt or sentencing determination."). The Burger Court's
habeas corpus decisions, however, cannot be understood solely as reflecting a desire to correct
errors relating to actual guilt or innocence; many other values are also reflected in the Burger
Court's habeas decisions. See Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examnitation
of Continuity and Change in Crimnal Procedure, 80 CoLUM. L. REV. 436 (1980).
11. See, e.g., Saltzburg, Habeas Corpus: The Supremne Court and Congress, 44 OHIO ST.
L.J. 367 (1983) (habeas corpus symbolic of ideal that no person shall be convicted in violation
of the fundamental law of the land.).
12. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 524 (1976) (Brennan, J.. dissenting)
("[P]rocedural safeguards ... are not admonitions to be tolerated only to the extent they
serve the functional purposes that ensure that the 'guilty' are punished and the 'innocent'
freed.").
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recognized. It is impossible to answer questions about habeas
corpus without considering basic issues of federalism, separation of
powers, the purposes of the criminal justice system, and the nature
of litigation. In fact, it is precisely because habeas corpus implicates
difficult and profound questions of American government that it is
an area where consensus is unlikely, disagreements are heated, and
shifts in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence are most manifest.
Thus, my purpose in this Article is to identify the issues which
must be confronted, in litigation or in legislation, in determining the
availability of habeas corpus. Part One briefly summarizes the his-
tory of habeas corpus and especially the shift in doctrine from the
Warren Court to the Burger Court. Part Two examines the ques-
tions which must be asked and faced in defining the scope of habeas
corpus relief. Finally, I conclude with some thoughts about how
each of the issues should be discussed and debated. The hope is to
add clarity and advance the dialogue in an area of the law long
regarded as essential to the protection of individual rights and civil
liberties.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS
The history of habeas corpus has been thoroughly chronicled. 3
Therefore, I only want to provide a brief summary of its evolution
to facilitate examination of its underlying themes. To the extent
that some believe that the scope of habeas corpus should be decided
by reference to Framers' intent, it is important to at least summa-
rize the accepted wisdom about the purposes of these provisions."
A. Background of the Habeas Doctrine
Habeas corpus existed in the American colonies prior to the
adoption of the Constitution.' 5 In many colonies there were claims
13. See generally W. DUKER, supra note 1; Rosenn, supra note 1.
14. There are constitutional scholars who believe that the Constitution should be inter-
preted solely on the basis of the text and the intent of the Framers. See generally R. BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT (1977); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1
(1971); Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976).
Although I have criticized these theorists elsewhere, see E. CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING
THE CONSTITUTION (forthcoming 1987), the debate here over the proper method of constitu-
tional interpretation is not likely to be decisive. There simply is no discernable Framers'
intent with regard to the specific questions confronting the Supreme Court in defining the
scope of habeas corpus. Additionally, it is even more likely that there will be disagreements
over the role of congressional intent in interpreting the habeas statutes and as to how particu-
lar provisions should be interpreted. See infra text accompanying notes 92-105.
15. Rosenn, supra note 1, at 338.
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to a common law right to habeas corpus and in others there were
provisions in the colonies' charters and in colonial statutes assuring
the availability of the writ of habeas corpus. 16 At the Constitutional
Convention, delegate Charles Pinckney proposed a provision to as-
sure the availability of habeas corpus.1 7 A compromise resulted and
instead of guaranteeing habeas corpus, the Constitution instead pro-
hibited its suspension. Recent English history taught the American
colonists of the likelihood and danger of suspensions of the writ.
Parliament frequently suspended the writ of habeas corpus during
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, allowing individuals to be
imprisoned without any legal protections.' 8 William Duker, in his
authoritative history of the writ of habeas corpus, argues that the
Framers feared that Congress might suspend the states' ability to
grant habeas corpus, in the same way that Parliament had sus-
pended habeas corpus in the colonies.' 9 Duker concludes that the
"provision was designed to restrict Congress from suspending state
habeas for federal prisoners."2° He wrote: "The framers of the
Constitution did not intend to guarantee a right to a federal writ.
Under the intent of the framers any right to federal habeas would be
purely statutory."
2 1
Congress, in the Judiciary Act of 1789, explicitly provided for
federal courts to grant habeas corpus to federal prison-
ers.2 2Although federal courts could not issue habeas to state prison-
ers, the Supreme Court upheld its ability to review the
constitutionality of state criminal convictions on direct appeal.23
After the Civil War, Congress feared that southern states would
persecute and even literally imprison former slaves.24  Congres-
sional investigations discovered that "despite a theoretical improve-
ment in legal status, Negroes remained virtually unprotected by
16. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391. 405 (1963); DUKER, supra note 1, at 98-99; Rosenn.
supra note 1, at 338.
17. W. DUKER, supra note 1, at 127.
18. Rosenn, supra note 1, at 338.
19. W. DUKER, supra note 1, at 126-56.
20. Id. at 131.
21. Id. at 155.
22. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (1789).
23. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264. 291-93 (1821). The Supreme Court
explicitly ruled that it did not have authority to grant habeas corpus to state prisoners under
the Judiciary Act of 1789. See Ex Parte Dorr, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103 (1845).
24. Oaks, Legal History in the High Courl: Habeas Corpus, 64 MICH. L. RFV. 451, 452
(1966) (purpose of statute, in part, was to free ex-slaves illegally imprisoned by states trying
to avoid emancipation decrees).
[Vol. 37:748
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State criminal processes."2 The Congressional Committee on Re-
construction concluded that former slaves were victims of "cruelty,
oppression and murder, which the local authorities are at no pains
to prevent or punish."26 Thus, one of the most important provi-
sions of the Reconstruction Act was to allow federal courts to grant
habeas corpus to state prisoners held in violation of the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States.2 7
Although there is disagreement about what the drafters of the
Act intended on many specific questions, 28 there is consensus that
the law was based on a distrust of southern states and was designed
to allow federal courts to especially protect former slaves from un-
constitutional confinement. The Supreme Court, shortly after the
adoption of the Act, noted that "[t]he legislation is of the most com-
prehensive character. It brings within the habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion of every court and of every judge every possible case of
deprivation of liberty contrary to the National Constitution, trea-
ties, or laws. It is impossible to widen this jurisdiction. '29 Thus,
Professor Redish observes, the "legislative intent-which has been
well documented by commentators and by the Court itself-was to
interpose the federal judiciary between the individual and the state,
largely because of the failure of the state courts adequately to pro-
tect the individual.",3 0
25. Rosenn, supra note 1, at 342 (quoting U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, LAW EN-
FORCEMENT: A REPORT ON EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE SOUTH 7 (1965)).
26. Id. (quoting JOINT COMM. ON RECONSTRUCTION, REPORT OF THE JOINT COMM.
ON RECONSTRUCTION, H.R. REP. No. 30, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. vii, xvii (1866)).
27. Act of February 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (codified as 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255
(1976)). The Act provided that the
several courts of the United States... within their respective jurisdictions, in addi-
tion to the authority already conferred by law, shall have power to grant writs of
habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty
in violation of the Constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States.
Id.
28. See W. DUKER, supra note 1, at 189-90 stating:
The words of the statute are unambiguous: that a state, as well as a federal, pris-
oner may avail himself of the protection of the Act seems all too obvious. However,
when one ventures beyond the text of the statute, the meaning of the Act and the
intent of its framers are not easy to determine.
Id. Compare Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rj-v. 579, 690-91 (1982) (statutory history and language supports Brown v. Allen's provi-
sion of federal habeas corpus review for all constitutional claims) with Bator, Finality in
Crimnal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 526
(1963) (rejects Brown v. Allen's theory because broad habeas corpus relitigation is incompat-
able with legality as fairness in the institutional process).
29. Ex Parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 325-26 (1867).
30. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers. and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94
YALE L.J. 71, !11 (1984) (emphasis in original; citations omitted).
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Nonetheless, in the first years after the adoption of the Recon-
struction Act, the application of habeas corpus was limited to cir-
cumstances in which the defendant alleged that the sentencing court
lacked jurisdiction.31 During the latter part of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the Supreme Court progressively expanded the circumstances
under which a federal court could find a lack of state court jurisdic-
tion and grant habeas corpus to a state prisoner.32 For example, the
Court found that a state court lacked jurisdiction when there was a
violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy 33 and when the
statute which was the basis for the prosecution was
unconstitutional.34
In 1915, the Supreme Court went even further and in the
landmark decision of Frank v. Magnum held that habeas corpus is
available whenever the state "supplying no corrective process,...
deprives the accused of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law."'35 However, according to Frank, so long as the state pro-
vided an adequate review process to hear the defendant's claims,
there was no basis for habeas relief for state prisoners.36 Frank was
important because it was the first time the Supreme Court recog-
nized that federal courts could grant habeas corpus to state prison-
ers on grounds other than that the trial court lacked jurisdiction.37
Although many habeas cases were decided during the first half
of the twentieth century, it was not until after World War II that
the scope of habeas corpus began to change dramatically. Several
pressures combined to necessitate a major revision in the principles
of habeas corpus. First, the application of the Bill of Rights to the
states through the incorporation process greatly expanded the op-
portunity for state violation of constitutional liberties. Early in
American history, the Supreme Court held that the Bill of Rights
did not apply to state government actions.38 Slowly at first, and
then at an accelerating pace, the Supreme Court held that the term
"liberty" in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
31. C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 831 (2d ed. 1986);
Friendly, supra note 9, at 151.
32. Hart, The Supreme Court-1958 Term, Foreward: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73
HARV. L. REv. 84, 103-04 (1959) (discusses the "long process of expansion of the concept of
lack of jurisdiction"); Rosenn, supra note 1, at 344.
33. Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
34. Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376 (1879).
35. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
36. Id. at 335.
37. The Supreme Court explicitly held that lack of jurisdiction was not the only basis for
habeas corpus in Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942).
38. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
[Vol. 37:748
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"incorporated" provisions of the Bill of Rights. 3 9 Through this in-
terpretive process the Supreme Court applied almost all of the Bill
of Rights to the states, including most of the provisions dealing with
criminal procedure.' Second, the expansion in the rights of crimi-
nal defendants also created more opportunity for claims that indi-
viduals were held in violation of the Constitution and laws of the
United States.4 In many areas, the Warren Court interpreted the
Constitution to provide additional procedural protections to crimi-
nal defendants, each of which could be the basis for a habeas peti-
tion if there was an allegation of infringement.4' Third, national
attention on civil rights after World War II served as a reminder
that blacks in the South were often unconstitutionally deprived of
their rights and lacked adequate protection in state courts. As the
Reconstruction Act proponents had intended, habeas corpus was
perceived as a vehicle to uphold and advance civil rights.4 3
Finally, the growth in the size of the country and the amount of
litigation meant that review by the United States Supreme Court
was not sufficient to remedy all allegedly unconstitutional convic-
tions. If there was to be federal court review of state court proce-
dures, it would have to be undertaken primarily in the district
courts through habeas corpus.'
39. See, eg., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (recognizing that some of the
Bill of Rights applied to the states because they are part of the conception of due process);
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (articulating principle of selective incorporation of
the Bill of Rights). See also Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History" and the Consti-
tutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. Cm. L. REV. 1 (1954); Fairman, Does the
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill ofRights?: The Original Understanding, 2 STAN.
L. REV. 5 (1948); Henkin, "Selective Incorporation "in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE
L.J. 74 (1963); Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights: the
Judicial Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. REv. 140 (1948).
40. See, eg., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (applying sixth amendment right to pub-
lic trials to states); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying fourth amendment right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and exclusionary rule, to states); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (applying sixth amendment right to counsel to states); Mal-
loy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (applying fifth amendment right to be free of compelled self-
incrimination to states); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (applying sixth amendment
right to confront witnesses to states); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (apply-
ing sixth amendment right to speedy trial to states); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968) (applying sixth amendment right to jury trials to states).
41. See generally Friendly, supra note 9.
42. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (protection of right against self-
incrimination requires warnings be given to criminal defendants); United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967) (right to counsel at lineups after initial appearance or indictment). Davis v.
Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (detention for fingerprinting unconstitutional if detention
does not comply with constraints of fourth amendment).
43. Rosenn, supra note 1, at 347-48.
44. Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Post Conviction Remedy for State Prisoners, 108 U.
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B. Habeas Corpus, the Warren Court, and the Burger Court
In comparing the habeas corpus jurisprudence of the Warren
and Burger Courts, I want to focus on two issues. First, when may
a state defendant present issues on habeas corpus that were not
raised at the time of the trial? Second, when may a state defendant
relitigate issues on habeas corpus that were raised and litigated at
the time of the trial? Although these issues also arise in the context
of federal prisoners, and although there are other issues where the
Warren and Burger Courts have differed, these two questions are
among the most frequently litigated and they are especially re-
vealing of the underlying perspectives of each Court.45
1. When May a Defendant Present Issues on Habeas Corpus
That Were Not Raised at the Time of the Trial?
In the 1963 decision of Fay v. Noia, the Supreme Court held that
an individual convicted in state court may raise, on habeas, issues
that were not presented at trial, unless it can be demonstrated that
he or she chose to deliberately bypass the state procedures.4 6 Jus-
tice Brennan, writing for the majority, began his analysis by observ-
ing that the Reconstruction Act gave the federal courts an
expansive role in preventing unconstitutional incarceration by state
governments. He observed:
Although the Act of 1867... nowhere defines habeas corpus, its
expansive language and imperative tone, viewed against the
backdrop of post-Civil War efforts in Congress to deal severely
with the States of the former Confederacy, would seem to make
inescapable the conclusion that Congress was enlarging the
habeas remedy as previously understood, not only in extending
its coverage to state prisoners, but also in making its procedures
more efficacious.47
In Fay, three codefendants were convicted. Years later, two of
them were successful in having their convictions overturned be-
cause of the manner in which their confessions were obtained. The
PA. L. REV. 461, 473-75 (1960) (the federalizing role of habeas corpus was performed by the
Supreme Court when there were less crowded dockets).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982) (applying cause and prejudice
to federal prisoners). Other important and controversial issues involving habeas corpus in-
clude the requirement for exhausting state remedies prior to federal court review, see. e.g.,
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (federal court should dismiss a habeas petition if it
presents any unexhausted claims), and the circumstances under which federal courts can hold
de novo fact-finding hearings, see, e.g., Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Maggio v.
Fulford, 462 U.S. 111 (1983); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422 (1983).
46. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
47. Id. at 415.
[Vol. 37:748
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New York state courts denied Noia's motion to have his conviction
overturned because his failure to appeal constituted a procedural
default precluding review. The Supreme Court rejected the argu-
ment that failure to comply with state procedures bars federal court
review on habeas corpus. The Court concluded that "a forfeiture of
remedies does not legitimize the unconstitutional conduct by which
• .. [a] conviction was procured.""a Thus, the Court saw its role
and the purpose of habeas corpus as preventing people from being
detained if their conviction resulted from unconstitutional conduct.
The Court said that a habeas petitioner would be foreclosed from
raising an issue on the ground that it was not presented at trial only
if he or she "deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure of the
state courts." 49
In sharp contrast, the Burger Court adopted a dramatically dif-
ferent standard. It consistently held that a habeas petition may
present issues not raised at trial only if there is good cause for the
omission and if the defendant was prejudiced by the failure to raise
the objections. In Davis v. United States5 ° and Francis v. Hender-
son,5 the Supreme Court refused to allow habeas petitions challeng-
ing the composition of grand juries when no challenge was made at
the time of trial. The Court held in both cases that the defendants
would be allowed to present the claims only if they could demon-
strate "cause" and "prejudice."
In Wainwright v. Sykes, the Supreme Court made clear that the
"deliberate by-pass" standard of Fay was no longer controlling;
rather, the defendants must show cause and prejudice before
presenting a matter on habeas that was not raised at trial." Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, emphasized the need to en-
courage defendants to raise all of their arguments in one proceed-
ing. 3 He approved the Francis rule of "cause" and "prejudice"
because it makes the state trial on the merits the "'main event' ...
rather than a 'tryout on the road' for what will later be a determina-
tive federal habeas hearing.""
After Sykes, the Burger Court repeatedly reaffirmed the cause
and prejudice test. In Engle v. Isaac, a defendant used habeas
48. Id. at 428.
49. Id. at 438.
50. 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
51. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
52. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
53. Id. at 90.
54. Id.
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corpus to challenge the constitutionality of the jury instructions
used in his case." In a case decided subsequent to his conviction,
the Ohio Supreme Court had held that the type of instructions
given violated Ohio statutory law and that its ruling applied retro-
actively to all cases where they had been used.56 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court held that the issue could not be raised on habeas
corpus because the defendant's attorney did not object at trial, even
though at that time there was no reason to think that the instruc-
tions were unconstitutional. Justice O'Connor writing for the ma-
jority concluded:
the futility of presenting an objection to the state courts cannot
alone constitute failure to object at trial .... Even a state court
that has previously rejected a constitutional argument may de-
cide, upon reflection, that the contention is valid. Allowing
criminal defendants to deprive the state courts of this opportu-
nity would contradict the principles supporting Sykes.57
The Court in Engle made clear that it took a very different view
of habeas corpus than had the Warren Court. Justice O'Connor
expressed great reservations about the availability of habeas corpus
because it imposes "significant costs on society," including "un-
dermin[ing] the usual principles of finality," "cost[ing] society the
right to punish admitted offenders," and "frustrat[ing] both the
States' sovereign power to punish offenders and their good faith at-
tempts to punish admitted offenders."5 8
Two years later, in Reed v. Ross, the Supreme Court recognized
that under limited circumstances, "where a constitutional claim is
so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel," a
defendant may present matters on habeas that were not raised at
trial.5 9 The Court made clear, however, that this was a very narrow
exception, not an overruling of Engle. As Professor Resnik notes,
"[a]lthough the Ross plurality found a crevice in the seemingly im-
pregnable 'cause' requirement of Isaac, the aperture is narrow....
Under Ross, the hurdle of 'cause' only can be surmounted in rare
instances."6 °
55. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
56. State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 110, 351 N.E.2d 88, 93 (1976). See also State
v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 103, 364 N.E.2d 1354, 1359 (1977) (jury instruction held
improper but defendant waived error by failing to object).
57. Engle, 456 U.S. at 130.
58. Id. at 126-27.
59. 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2910 (1984) (the decision was five to four, with four of the Justices
who were in the majority in Engle-Justices Blackmun, Burger, O'Connor and Rehnquist-
dissenting).
60. Resnik, Tiers, 57 So. CAt.. L. REV. 837, 904-05 (1984).
[Vol. 37:748
THINKING ABOUT HABEAS CORPUS
Last year, the Supreme Court strongly reaffirmed the cause and
prejudice test and held that an attorney's inadvertence, not rising to
the level of ineffective assistance of counsel, does not constitute
cause sufficient to allow matters to be raised on habeas that were
not presented at trial.6 ' Justice O'Connor, again writing for the
majority, concluded that "the mere fact that counsel failed to recog-
nize the factual or legal basis for a claim, or failed to raise the claim
despite recognizing it, does not constitute cause for a procedural
default."62 The Court again noted the "profound societal costs that
attend the exercise of habeas jurisdiction" and concluded that there
was nothing unfair about enforcing procedural default rules absent
a "substantial claim that the alleged error undermined the accuracy
of the guilt or sentencing determination."63 The Warren Court, as
reflected in Fay, saw it as essential that constitutional errors be cor-
rected and therefore refused to allow procedural defaults to pre-
clude habeas corpus unless there was proof that the attorney
"deliberately by-passed" state procedures. In sharp contrast, the
Burger Court viewed upholding the finality of convictions and en-
couraging presentation of all objections at trial as paramountly im-
portant and thus consistently held that procedural defaults do
prevent habeas review, except in the relatively rare circumstances
that there is "cause" for the default and "prejudice" from it.
2. When May a Defendant Relitigate on Habeas Corpus Issues
That Were Raised and Litigated in State Court?
The principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel preclude a
party from relitigating a matter already presented to a court and
decided upon. Brown v. Allen, decided in 1953, created an impor-
tant exception to collateral estoppel and res judicata for habeas peti-
tions."4 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter,
held that any constitutional claim may be raised on habeas, even
though it had been raised, fully litigated and decided in state court.
61. Smith v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. 2661 (1986).
62. Id. at 2667. In another case last year, the Court again noted "[a]ttorney error short
of ineffective assistance of counsel does not constitute cause for a procedural default even
when that default occurs on appeal rather than trial." Murray v. Carrier, 106 S. Ct. 2639,
2648 (1986).
63. Smith, 106 S. Ct. at 2668. In another case last Term, the Supreme Court specified
the circumstances under which there is cause for a procedural default. Murray, 106 S. Ct. at
2639. The Court said that cause exists if the factual or legal basis for the claim was not
available at the time the claim should have been made, as in Reed v. Ross; when state officials
interfered with the attorney's ability to avoid default; or when there was ineffective assistance
of counsel. Id. at 2646-47; C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, supra note 31, at 836-37.
64. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
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Justice Frankfurter observed that "even the highest state courts"
have failed to give adequate protection to federal constitutional
rights." Habeas corpus exists to remedy state court disregard or
violations of defendant's rights. Brown thus established that "a
state prisoner ought to have an opportunity for a hearing on a fed-
eral constitutional claim in a federal court."66
In fact, the Warren Court so valued the importance of the op-
portunity to relitigate constitutional issues to assure correct deci-
sions, it held that a prisoner convicted by a federal court may also
raise issues on habeas that had been presented and decided at trial.67
The Court concluded that "the provision of federal collateral relief
rests ... fundamentally upon a recognition that adequate protec-
tion of constitutional rights ... requires the continuing availability
of a mechanism of relief.",
68
In marked contrast, the Burger Court in Stone v. Powell held
that fourth amendment search and seizure claims may not be reliti-
gated on habeas corpus. 69 The Court concluded that "where the
State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a
Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted fed-
eral habeas relief on the ground that the evidence obtained in an
unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at trial."7 The
Court emphasized that exclusionary rule claims do not relate to the
accuracy of the fact finding process and rejected the assertion that
state judges would be less vigilant than their federal counterparts in
protecting federal constitutional rights.7' Whereas the Court in
Brown had explicitly noted frequent state court disregard of the
Constitution, Justice Powell writing for the majority in Stone said
that we are "unwilling to assume that there now exists a lack of
appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and appel-
late courts of the several states."
72
The Supreme Court has not, however, extended Stone to other
constitutional rights or limited the application of Brown. After
Stone, the Court held that challenges to the racial composition of
65. Id. at 511.
66. Hart, supra note 32, at 106-07.
67. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
68. Id. at 226.
69. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
70. Id. at 494. See Halpern, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Mapp Exclusionary Rule
Afier Stone v. Powell, 82 Coi.uM. L. REv. 1 (1982) (reviewing court interpretations of what
constitutes a "full and fair" hearing after Stone).
71. Stone, 428 U.S. at 489-94.
72. Id. at 493 n.35.
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grand juries,7 3 and to jury instructions concerning the standard of
proof to be applied,74 may be relitigated on habeas although these
issues had been presented and decided at trial. Last year, the
Supreme Court held that Stone does not preclude a defendant from
raising ineffective assistance of counsel on habeas corpus, even
though the basis for that claim is the failure of counsel to present a
fourth amendment objection to evidence.75
Nonetheless, the difference between Brown and Stone is remark-
able. Because fourth amendment exclusionary rule claims are fre-
quently the basis for habeas petitions, and because there is a clear
difference in the rhetoric and reasoning of the two decisions, they
are illustrative in understanding the evolution of the habeas corpus
doctrine.
II. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF HABEAS CORPUS: THE ISSUES
On a political level, the differing approaches to habeas corpus in
the Warren and Burger Courts are not surprising. The Warren
Court is remembered for its concern for protecting civil rights and
civil liberties, especially the rights of criminal defendants. Habeas
corpus was an obvious tool to facilitate judicial review and uphold
constitutional rights in the criminal justice system. In contrast, the
more conservative Burger Court showed far less concern for defend-
ant's rights and frequently eroded protections created by the War-
ren Court.7 6 Habeas corpus not only was a less important way of
achieving important objectives, but more importantly it was disfa-
vored as it permitted guilty defendants to secure their release from
77prison.
Although this political assessment is correct as far as it goes, it
is too easy and too final an appraisal of the Courts and their ap-
proaches to habeas corpus. Reducing the disagreement to the dif-
ference between liberals and conservatives leaves no room for
dialogue or reasoning to bridge that disagreement. It provides no
basis for analysis of what should be the appropriate scope of habeas
corpus. Additionally, it masks the fundamental issues that are
73. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
74. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
75. Kimmelman v. Morris, 106 S. Ct. 2574 (1986).
76. For a description of the difference between the jurisprudence of the Burger and War-
ren Courts in criminal justice cases and a partial listing of cases where the Burger Court
overruled or limited Warren Court precedents, see C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, supra
note 31, at 3-9.
77. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 (1982) (habeas "cost[s] society the right
to punish admitted offenders.").
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presented in deciding when federal courts should be able to grant
habeas corpus relief.
There are four major issues that must be confronted in deciding
the availability of habeas corpus: federalism, separation of powers,
constitutional rights and collateral review.78 On each of these issues
the Warren Court and the Burger Court took very different
positions.
A. Federalism: When Should Federal Courts Review State Court
Judgments and Proceedings?
The question of when state prisoners can obtain habeas corpus
review in federal courts inescapably requires consideration of the
proper relationship between the federal and state judiciaries. How
much should federal courts defer to state court decisions and pro-
ceedings in criminal cases? It is impossible to answer this question
without considering the relative competence of the federal and state
courts in upholding federal constitutional rights. For example, in
order to decide whether a state prisoner should be able to relitigate
on habeas corpus a matter that was fully litigated in state court it is
necessary to determine whether there is any reason not to accord
finality to the state court decision.
The question of relative competence might be avoided by stipu-
lating the relationship between federal and state courts. For exam-
ple, it might be asserted that there should be a federal forum
available for all constitutional rights, regardless of the state court's
ability to uphold federal claims. Alternatively, it could be posited
that the principle of comity requires deference to state courts and
prevents a federal court from rehearing matters already litigated in
a state court. Such approaches, however, are problematic. First,
they are definitional arguments and are impossible to appraise, dis-
cuss, or refute, unless reasons are given for them. Second, unless
the reasons focus on the relative competence and willingness of
these courts to uphold federal constitutional rights, the arguments
assume that institutional arrangements are ends in themselves. The
appropriate relationship of courts can only be assessed relative to
the goals to be achieved. Although courts exist to serve many func-
78. It is important to resist the temptation to view the habeas doctrine as reflecting any
single one of these issues; instead, it should be viewed as a reflection of a complex interaction
of these issues. Cf. Seidman, supra note 10, at 445 ("The search for any single model explain-
ing every result that the Supreme Court reaches leads inevitably to oversimplification and
distortion.").
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tions, 79 the proper application of the Constitution and protection of
constitutional rights is the most important end in constitutional
cases.
Therefore, deciding the scope of habeas corpus necessitates con-
sideration of the relative willingness and ability of state and federal
courts to correctly apply the Constitution and protect the rights of
criminal defendants. As such, it should not be surprising that the
Warren and Burger Courts articulated very different views on the
parity between these Courts in upholding constitutional liberties.
In interpreting the Reconstruction Act statutes, the Warren Court
expanded federal court jurisdiction by citing the history of state
court disregard for federal constitutional rights.8 0 The Court re-
jected a requirement that litigants exhaust state remedies in civil
rights cases under section 1983, on the grounds that state court pro-
tection of federal constitutional rights often is unavailable."' The
Court observed that section 1983, another key part of the Recon-
struction statutes, is based on a distrust of state courts and a belief
in the superiority of federal courts in protecting federal rights:
Congress clearly conceived that it was altering the relationship
between the States and the Nation with respect to the protection
of federally created rights; it was concerned that state instrumen-
talities could not protect those rights; it realized that state of-
ficers might, in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of those
rights; and it believed that these failings extended to state
courts. . . . The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the
federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of
the people's federal rights.82
In Brown v. Allen, the Court upheld the relitigation of constitu-
tional claims on habeas corpus in federal court, even after full litiga-
tion in state court, because state courts frequently fail to adequately
protect federal rights.8 3 Additionally, in Fay v. Noia, the Warren
79. For an excellent description of the values in the litigation system, see Resnik, supra
note 60, at 845-59.
80. For a review of the Warren Court decisions based on the assumption that state
courts were not to be trusted to adequately protect federal constitutional rights, see
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1118 n.48 (1977) ("The Warren
Court's major forum allocation decisions appear based on ... [the] assumption that poten-
tially outcome-determinative distinctions exist between state and federal courts which justify
a broad choice of forum for constitutional claims."). See, e.g., Zvickler v. Koota, 389 U.S.
241 (1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963);
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
81. See, e.g., Monroe, 365 U.S. at 168; Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496,
496 (1982).
82. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
83. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
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Court refused to give effect to most state court procedural defaults,
emphasizing historical reasons for distrusting states to protect fed-
eral rights.1
4
In contrast, the Burger Court frequently has proclaimed that
state courts are equal to federal courts in protecting federal rights,
making federal relitigation unnecessary." In Stone v. Powell, the
Court remarked that there is "no intrinsic reason why the fact that
a man is a federal judge should make him more competent, or con-
scientious, or learned with respect to [constitutional claims] than
his neighbor in the state courthouse."8 6 The Court explicitly said
that it was unwilling to assume that state courts were insensitive to
or incapable of adequately protecting federal rights.8 7
Similarly, in the academic literature much of the disagreement
over the scope of habeas corpus is based on differing views of the
relative competence of federal and state courts. Some commenta-
tors, such as Professor Paul Bator, argue that states are to be
trusted in upholding federal constitutional rights, making relitiga-
tion in federal courts on habeas petitions unnecessary.88 Other
writers, such as Professors Burt Neuborne and Gary Peller, ex-
pressly challenge the assumption of parity and argue that historical
experience and structural differences between federal and state
courts demonstrate the need for federal courts to enforce constitu-
tional rights.89
In short, deciding when state prisoners are entitled to habeas
corpus relief from federal courts requires consideration of federal-
ism issues and especially an analysis of the relative abilities of the
state and federal courts in constitutional analysis.
84. Fay, 372 U.S. at 416, 421-22.
85. See, e.g., Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 549 (1981):
State judges as well as federal judges swear allegiance to the Constitution of the
United States, and there is no reason to think that because of their frequent differ-
ences of opinion as to how that document should be interpreted, all are not doing
their mortal best to discharge their oath of office.
Id.; Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3146 n.2 (1985), reh'g denied, 106 S.
Ct. 18 (1985) ("It denigrates the judges who serve on state courts to suggest that they will not
enforce the supreme law of the land."). See also cases reviewed in Neuborne, supra note 79,
1118 at n.48.
86. Stone, 428 U.S. at 493 n.35.
87. Id.
88. See generally Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 Wm.
& MARY L. REV. 605 (1981); Bator, supra note 28.
89. See Peller, supra note 28, at 665-69; Neuborne, supra note 80.
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B. Separation of Powers: Is It for Congress to Decide the Scope
of Habeas Corpus and, If So, What Was Congressional
Intent in Adopting the Habeas Corpus
Statutes?
Habeas corpus has both constitutional and statutory origins.
The Constitution prohibits Congress from suspending the writ of
habeas corpus, and statutes empower the federal courts to release
federal and state prisoners held in violation of the Constitution and
laws of the United States. There is little indication of the Framers
intent regarding the scope of review in habeas corpus cases. 90 In
fact, there is strong evidence that the Framers did not intend to
create a right to habeas corpus, let alone to define that right; rather,
they intended to prevent Congress from suspending the writ and
thereby prevent state courts from releasing individuals who were
wrongfully imprisoned. 91 Furthermore, whatever intent that can be
discerned is of little use in deciding when state prisoners can reliti-
gate claims in federal court on habeas or present objections not
raised in state courts. As explained earlier, it was not until after the
Civil War that Congress extended habeas corpus to state prisoners.
Therefore, there is a strong argument that the scope of habeas
corpus is a statutory question, to be decided by the courts in accord
with traditional principles of statutory construction. There are ad-
ditional reasons for concluding that Congress should decide the
availability of federal court habeas corpus relief. First, the Supreme
Court has held that Congress has broad authority to determine the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.92 Because Congress has dis-
cretion under the Constitution as to whether to create lower federal
courts, it also has discretion to determine their jurisdiction.93 Ac-
cordingly, Congress should decide the lower federal court jurisdic-
90. See W. DUKER, supra note 1, at 135-36.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 20-2 1.
92. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448-49 (1850); Lauf v. E.G. Shinner
& Co., 303 U.S. 323, 327 (1938). There is a rich academic literature on the subject of Con-
gressional control over lower federal court jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bator, Congressional Power
Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030 (1982); Eisenberg, Con-
gressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974);
Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Jurisdiction: An Opiniouated Guide to the
On-Going Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Sager, Foreward: Constitutional Limitations
on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. Rt-v.
17 (1981).
93. See, e.g., Sheldon, 49 U.S. (8 How.) at 441; Lauf 303 U.S. at 327; Palmore v.
United States, 411 U.S. 389, 400-01 (1973).
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tion in habeas cases.94
Second, because the issue of federal court review of state court
judgments and proceedings is a question of federalism, Congress is
the appropriate institution to determine the scope of habeas corpus.
Professor Herbert Weschler, in one of his famous articles, argued
that the national political process best determines the proper rela-
tionship between the federal and state governments: "[T]o the ex-
tent that federalist values have real significance they must give rise
to local sensitivity to central intervention; to the extent that such a
local sensitivity exists, it cannot fail to find reflection in Con-
gress."95 The national political process in the United States-and
especially the role of the states in the composition and selection of
the central government-is intrinsically well adapted to retarding
or restraining new intrusions by the center on the domain of the
states.96 The Supreme Court, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, recently relied on Wechsler's theory to justify
complete judicial deference to Congress in matters of federalism
arising under the Commerce Clause.97 Likewise, it can be argued
that Congress-with its "reflection" of "local sensitivity"-should
be accorded complete deference in its allocation of power between
federal and state courts in habeas corpus.
The difficulty with this theory is that Congress could then elimi-
nate all habeas corpus in federal courts or abolish habeas for certain
classes of cases, such as certain types of crimes or particular types of
constitutional challenges. If Congress were to eliminate the federal
writ of habeas corpus, entirely or partially, is that not a suspension
of habeas corpus in violation of Article I of the Constitution? Evi-
dently, Congress acts unconstitutionally when it legislates with the
purpose and effect of preventing the vindication of constitutional
rights.98
The response to this concern is that such restrictions of federal
court jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus are not unconstitutional so
94. For an excellent argument criticizing the Court for not following congressional juris-
dictional statutes in other areas, see Redish, supra note 30.
95. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalisin: The Role of the States in the Conm-
position and Selection of the National Government, 54 CotIM. L. REv. 543. 547 (1954). See
also J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL. REvIEW AND rHE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980) (argu-
ing for judicial deference to Congress in matters of federalism).
96. Wechsler, supra note 95, at 547.
97. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
98. Cf Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948). cert. denied.
335 U.S. 887 (1948) (unconstitutional for Congress to eliminate access to all courts).
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long as state courts remain available to protect federal rights.99
Yet, this raises concerns as to whether state courts are to be trusted
to adequately protect federal rights on habeas corpus and, if not,
whether it unconstitutionally violates separation of powers for Con-
gress to prevent the judiciary from protecting federal constitutional
rights. Arguably, the core role of the federal courts in the scheme
of separation of powers is to assure the protection of federal rights,
and Congress acts unconstitutionally when it restricts habeas juris-
diction to undermine constitutional liberties. 100
If it is conceded that Congress should define the scope of habeas
corpus, at least absent attempts to eliminate habeas jurisdiction, the
question then becomes what did Congress intend in creating the
habeas statutes? There is substantial disagreement among commen-
tators and Justices as to congressional intent. For example, con-
servatives such as Professor Bator argue that the Reconstruction
Act, which authorizes habeas for state prisoners, had limited objec-
tives. Professor Bator contends that the drafters of the Act thought
that the issues raised on habeas would be limited to challenges to
the jurisdiction of the tribunal.)°0 Bator argues that "it would...
require rather overwhelming evidence to show that it was the pur-
pose of the legislature to tear habeas corpus entirely out of ... its
historical meaning and.., convert it into an ordinary writ of error
with respect to all federal questions."' 02 Several Supreme Court
Justices have expressed similar limited views of Congress' intent. 103
In contrast, other commentators and Justices see a much
broader congressional purpose underlying the Reconstruction Act.
They argue that Congress greatly distrusted state courts and there-
fore allowed state prisoners access to federal courts to assure pro-
tection of constitutional rights. 1°4 As Professor Amsterdam
observes, the "[t]hirty-ninth Congress thoroughly distrusted the
99. See, e.g., Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 382-83 (1977) (Constitution requires only
that some court be available to hear habeas petitions).
100. See, eg., Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605, 607
(Constitution of its own force vests jurisdiction in federal courts to issue habeas corpus). Cf.
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1872) (declaring a restriction of Supreme
Court jurisdiction unconstitutional, as a violation of separation of powers).
101. Bator, supra note 28, at 466. See also Oaks, supra note 24, at 452.
102. Bator, supra note 28, at 475.
103. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 255 (1973) (Powell, J., concur-
ring); Brown, 344 U.S. at 533 (Jackson, J., concurring).
104. See, e.g., Seidman, supra note 10, at 462 n.155 ("the Reconstruction Congress, suspi-
cious of state attempts to subvert federal rights, intended to provide a forum in the lower
federal courts for their vindication."); Tushnet, Judicial Revision of the Habeas Corpus Stat-
utes: A Note on Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 484, 487-91.
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State courts and expected nothing from them but resistance and
harassment."' '° Accordingly, it is argued that it was not intended
that federal courts hearing habeas petitions would defer to state
courts.
After carefully reviewing the legislative history and the early
case law, Professor Gary Peller disagrees with Professor Bator and
argues that Congress, in enacting the Reconstruction Act, meant to
allow state prisoners to relitigate their habeas claims in federal
court. 10 6 Likewise, the Supreme Court, in cases such as Fay v. Noia,
took a broad view of the habeas statutes as empowering the federal
courts to remedy state court deprivations of constitutional rights.' o7
Thus, a second issue to be confronted in defining the scope of
habeas corpus is to what extent must the Court follow Congres-
sional intention in determining the availability of habeas corpus and
what did Congress intend in adopting the existing habeas statutes.
C. What is the Purpose of Constitutional Rights in the Criminal
Justice System?
Should habeas corpus be limited to providing relief for prisoners
who demonstrate a reasonable probability that they are actually in-
nocent and were wrongfully convicted, or should habeas be avail-
able to all defendants who can demonstrate that their conviction
likely resulted from a violation of their constitutional rights, regard-
less of whether they are factually guilty or innocent? This issue,
perhaps more than any other, divides commentators and explains
the disagreement between the Warren and Burger Courts.0 8
Answering these questions about the scope of habeas corpus re-
quires consideration of the purpose of the underlying rights that
habeas exists to protect. If constitutional rights are primarily
designed to protect innocent individuals and assure that only those
who actually committed a crime will be convicted, then it makes
sense to limit habeas to those who are arguably innocent.' By
105. Amsterdam, Crininal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Cil Rights:
Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial. 113 U. P.\. L.
Ri-v. 793, 818 (1965).
106. Peller, supra note 28, at 619-21.
107. Fay, 372 U.S. at 422, 424.
108. For an excellent discussion of the role this factor has played in the Burger Court
decisions, see Seidman, supra note 10. I agree with Professor Seidman that the Burger Court
cannot be understood as solely focusing on factual guilt although it certainly is a major factor
in many of its decisions.
109. See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 111-12 (1977): Stone. 428 U.S. at 489-
92, 496 (Burger, C.J., concurring): United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448-49 (1976):
[Vol. 37:748
THINKING ABOUT HABEAS CORPUS
contrast, if constitutional rights serve other purposes besides pro-
tecting the innocent-goals such as controlling police behavior and
protecting individual privacy and dignity-then habeas corpus
should be available regardless of guilt or innocence.
The Burger Court's criminal procedure decisions were animated
by a deep conviction that the overriding goal of the criminal justice
system is to punish the guilty and exonerate the innocent.110 Pro-
fessor Seidman notes that "[flactual guilt or innocence has been a
preoccupation of the Burger Court, at least rhetorically.""' Simi-
larly, Professors Whitebread and Slobogin observe:
The first theme is the 'Burger Court's' belief that the ultimate
mission of the criminal justice system is to convict the guilty and
let the innocent go free. The Warren Court tried to encourage
respect for individual rights in the aggregate. In so doing, it
often required the release of a factually guilty defendant in order
to ensure an appropriate process.... [The Burger Court's] deci-
sions suggest that the rights enumerated in the Constitution are
not all entitled to the same degree of judicial protection, but in-
stead should be valued according to their impact on the ade-
quacy of the guilt determining process.' 12
Some constitutional rights, most notably the fourth amend-
ment's protection against unreasonable search and seizure, cannot
be understood in terms of protecting innocent defendants.' 13 How-
ever, if the primary goal of the criminal justice system is punishing
the guilty, it is sensible to limit habeas corpus to defendants who
have a claim of factual innocence. A plurality of the Burger Court,
consisting of Justices Powell, Blackmun, Burger and Rehnquist,
stated that the "central reason for habeas corpus [was to afford] a
means ... of redressing an unjust incarceration."' 14
Thus, in Stone the Burger Court held that fourth amendment
exclusionary rule claims may not be relitigated in habeas corpus.
The Court reasoned that because fourth amendment claims do not
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 521, 535-36 (1975); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82
(1970).
110. Seidman, supra note 10, at 436-37. For an excellent exposition of the position that
habeas review should be limited to protecting arguably innocent defendants, see Friendly,
supra note 9.
111. Seidman, supra note 10, at 445 n.47. See also Seidman, The Trial and Execution of
Bruno Richard Hauptinann: Still Another Case That "Will Not Die", 66 GEo. L.J. 1, 46
(1977) (noting "preoccupation with the issue of factual guilt or innocence.").
112. C. WHITEBREAD & C. St.OBOGIN, supra note 31, at 3-4.
113. In Stone v. Powell, the Supreme Court explicitly noted that fourth amendment exclu-
sionary rule claims do not relate to the integrity of the fact finding process. 428 U.S. 468,
503-06, 515-16 (1976).
114. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 257-58 (emphasis in original).
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relate to the integrity of the fact finding process, they do not justify
disrupting the finality of the conviction and the other costs attend-
ant to habeas review.' 5 The Court's conclusion was based on the
belief that "exclusionary rule claims are disfavored because they
frustrate the true aim of the criminal process: conviction of the
guilty and acquittal of the innocent. Reversal of a conviction for a
fourth amendment violation was therefore an inappropriate exercise
of habeas corpus jurisdiction.""' 6 Likewise, in greatly restricting
the ability of defendants to present matters on habeas that were not
raised at trial, the Court has emphasized the function of habeas as
protecting wrongfully convicted prisoners. For example, the Court
narrowly defined what constitutes sufficient "cause" for not making
a contemporaneous objection so as to allow the matter to be raised
on habeas," 7 but held that "in an extraordinary case, where a con-
stitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one
who is actually innocent, a federal habeas corpus court may grant
the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the proce-
dural default.""' 8 The result is that those who are arguably inno-
cent can present their constitutional claims, but few other
defendants will be allowed to argue matters on habeas that were not
raised at trial, even if the default was a result of the attorney's
error. 119
Also, in defining "prejudice" the Supreme Court seems to re-
quire some showing that the defendant is arguably innocent and
was wrongfully convicted because of the procedural default at
trial.'2 ° The Court has explicitly held that "we... reject the sug-
gestion that there is anything 'fundamentally' unfair about enforc-
ing procedural default rules in cases devoid of any substantial claim
that the alleged error undermined the accuracy of the guilt or sen-
tencing determination."' 2 '
The Warren Court, by contrast, saw much broader goals for
115. Stone, 428 U.S. at 490-95. See Cover & Alienikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas
Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1086 (1977) ("Stone v. Powell viewed the central
function of habeas corpus as protection of innocent defendants from unconstitutional denials
of their liberty.").
116. Cover & Alienikoff, supra note 115, at 1076.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 60-63 (cases defining "cause").
118. Murray v. Carrier, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2650 (1986).
119. Unless the attorney's error amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel, it is not
"cause" justifying its presentation on habeas corpus. See id. at 2648 ("Attorney error short
of ineffective assistance of counsel does not constitute cause for a procedural default.").
120. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 171 (1982); Yackle, supra note 8, at 646
n. 170 (Frady standard equates prejudice with innocence).
121. Smith v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. 2661, 2668 (1986).
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constitutional rights and habeas corpus. Although the primary pur-
pose of individual liberties is to prevent the conviction of innocent
persons, rights also are enforced as a way of deterring unlawful po-
lice practices and of protecting individual privacy and dignity from
government infringement.122 Justice Brennan stated this view
forcefully in his dissent in Stone: "[P]rocedural safeguards ... are
not admonitions to be tolerated only to the extent they serve func-
tional purposes that ensure that the 'guilty' are punished and the
'innocent' freed." 123
Under this view, habeas corpus exists to assure that no person is
in custody because of a conviction obtained in violation of the Con-
stitution of the United States. In Brown v. Allen, the Court allowed
relitigation of all constitutional claims, regardless of whether they
relate to guilt or innocence.124 Similarly, in Fay v. Noia, the Warren
Court allowed all defendants, without regard to their actual guilt or
innocence, to raise objections despite procedural defaults at trial
(unless it was shown that they deliberately by-passed state proce-
dures).'25 This perspective views "habeas corpus as symbolic of a
commitment to constitutional values and to the ideal that no person
shall be convicted in violation of the fundamental law of the
land."' 2 6
It should be noted that there is an intermediate position between
a view that habeas corpus should be limited to protecting those with
a claim of innocence and a view that all constitutional claims should
be allowed on habeas review. Justice Stevens, for example, consist-
ently has argued that habeas should be available when a defendant
raises a claim of "fundamental unfairness."'' 27 This approach, of
course, begs a definition of what constitutes "fundamental
unfairness."
Therefore, deciding the scope of habeas corpus necessitates anal-
ysis of the purpose of criminal procedure rights and of the entire
criminal justice system. Are individual liberties and habeas corpus
solely to protect the innocent from wrongful conviction or are there
other important objectives to be upheld?
122. See C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, supra note 31, at 1-5 (describing Warren
Court's views of the criminal justice system).
123. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 524 (1976).
124. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
125. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
126. Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 367.
127. See, e.g., Smith v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. 2661, 2669-77 (Stevens, J., concurring); Mur-
ray v. Carrier, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2650-60 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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D. The Role of Collateral Review: and the Tension Between
Finality and Revisions
Finally, in order to define the scope of habeas corpus it is neces-
sary to confront the basic tension between wanting to end criminal
cases and preserve finality, and wanting to allow the opportunity for
revisions to correct mistakes.128 Habeas corpus occurs after all ap-
peals have been exhausted.1 29 Those arguing for limits on the scope
of habeas review contend that except under compelling circum-
stances, such as when the habeas petitioner has a colorable claim of
innocence or has been denied a fair opportunity to present his or her
claims in state court, additional resources should not be expended
on further review of a case that has already been litigated and de-
cided.' 3 ° In sharp contrast, advocates of broader habeas review ar-
gue that "jurisdictional redundancy" serves important values,
especially in offering additional opportunities to correct mistakes. '
3
'
Arguments about the relative merits of finality and revisions
cannot be separated from the issues analyzed previously. The more
state courts are trusted and the less concern there is for constitu-
tional violations unrelated to guilt or innocence, the less the need
for upsetting finality. Conversely, the greater the distrust of state
courts' willingness or ability to protect constitutional rights and the
greater the desire to protect all constitutional rights, the more there
is a need to provide an additional chance for revision.
The Burger Court repeatedly emphasized the costs of habeas
corpus for the criminal justice system. 132 The loss of finality im-
poses economic costs in terms of expenditure of additional judicial
resources. Professor Bator argues that the "automatic collateral re-
litigation model exacts severe costs. It is profligate with resources
at a time of increasing scarcity."' t3 3 The Burger Court's decisions
have frequently expressed the concern that if procedural defaults
128. For a superb discussion of the values of procedural systems involved in deciding the
manner of review of a court's decisions, see Resnik, supra note 60, at 845-59.
129. See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982) (habeas petitions will be dismissed
unless all appeals on all claims presented within them have been exhausted).
130. Professor Paul Bator has been one of the most ardent advocates of this position. See
Bator, supra note 28, at 451-52; Bator, supra note 88, at 610-11.
131. See generally Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest. Ideology and
Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981); Cover & Alienikoff, supra note 115, at
1042.
132. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982) ("[T]he Great Writ entails signifi-
cant costs."); Smith, 106 S. Ct. at 2668 (In view of the "profound societal costs that attend
the exercise of habeas jurisdiction, such exercise 'carries a serious burden of justification.'"
(citation omitted)).
133. Bator, supra note 88, at 614.
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are not enforced, defense counsel will have an incentive to "sand-
bag" some of their claims for habeas corpus.' 34 The result would be
a waste of judicial resources as litigation would be divided into
many phases. 3
5
Additionally, it is argued that disrupting finality undermines the
purposes of the criminal justice system. For example, one claim is
that if convictions are overturned on habeas, there is less predict-
ability and certainty of punishment, and therefore less deterrence of
future crimes. 136 Likewise, some argue that rehabilitation of prison-
ers is frustrated by the availability of habeas review because it pre-
vents them from facing and dealing with the reality of their crime
and punishment.' 37
Perhaps most persuasively, it is argued that a large number of
nonmeritorious habeas petitions causes a judicial predisposition to-
wards dismissal, making it more difficult for deserving individuals
to gain needed relief.' 38  In Brown v. Allen, Justice Jackson ex-
plained: "It must prejudice the occasional meritorious application
to be buried in a flood of worthless ones. He who must search a
haystack for a needle is unlikely to end up with the attitude that the
needle is worth the search."' 139
In contrast, the Warren Court and defenders of broader habeas
review have emphasized the importance of collateral review as a
method of error correction. As Professor Resnik explains:
The perception that humans are fallible suggests that decisions
rendered by the first person to rule on a dispute may be in error.
The hope is that later, the same person or another person with a
different vantage point, may be able to find and rectify errors.
Under certain circumstances, finality bows to error correction.1 4a
Professor Cover argues that "jurisdictional redundancy" serves
many functions including error correction, providing greater assur-
134. See, e.g., wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89 (1977); United States v. Frady, 456
U.S. 152, 164 (1982); Engle, 456 U.S. at 130-34.
135. Cf. McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1325 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., dissenting)
(expressing dislike for "multiphasic" criminal proceedings).
136. See, e.g., Burger, Annual Report to the American Bar Association by the Chief Justice
of the United States, 67 A.B.A. J. 290, 292 (1981); Stone, 428 U.S. at 489-90.
137. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 88, at 614.
138. Friendly, supra note 9, at 149.
139. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
140. Resnik, supra note 60, at 855. See also Cover, supra note 131, at 653:
It is therefore in order to ask whether redundancy in the design of the adjudicatory
system furthers the desired end of reducing error defined simplistically as deviation
of outcomes from those that would be predicated upon an accurate and truthful
account of the event. The answer to this question is an unqualified 'yes'.
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ances of legitimacy of decisions to litigants,14 1 preventing one ideol-
ogy from imposing its will in a pluralistic society, 142 and
encouraging innovation through a dialogue between differing court
systems and perspectives. 4 3 Thus, the expenditure of resources in
review of habeas petitions is completely justified.
Additionally, defenders of habeas refute the arguments ad-
vanced by its critics. For instance, it is argued that defense attor-
neys have little incentive to sandbag arguments for habeas corpus;
their most rational strategic behavior is to present the strongest ar-
guments at trial and hope to win there.'" Moreover, it is argued
that the effects of habeas corpus on the criminal justice system are
totally speculative assertions. The chance of a habeas reversal is
sufficiently low that it is unlikely that it effects the deterrence of
crime. Moreover, rehabilitation is now seldom considered a likely
effect of the criminal justice and penal systems. Finally, it is denied
that meritorious habeas cases are lost simply because of the large
number of petitions. It is argued that habeas cases are a relatively
small portion of the federal courts' docket and there is not a sub-
stantially greater danger of frivolous claims in habeas cases than
elsewhere. 1
45
Thus, there is a dispute over the benefits and costs of revisions
through habeas corpus. Some see relatively little gained and great
cost; others find substantial benefits and therefore acceptable costs.
Ultimately, a determination of the proper scope of habeas must con-
front this tension between the desire for finality and the benefits of
revisions.
I have identified four issues in deciding the availability of habeas
relief and in comparing the Warren and Burger Courts: federalism,
separation of powers, the function of criminal rights, and the desira-
bility of collateral relief. Although I have primarily examined these
issues independently, it is important to note their interrelationship.
For instance, if it is decided that it is for Congress to define the
scope of habeas corpus, then the proper approach to each of the
other issues is to identify Congress' intent in adopting the habeas
statutes.
141. Cover, supra note 131, at 661.
142. Id. at 667-69.
143. Id. at 673.
144. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 60, at 897 (the sandbagging argument "'assumes a fan-
tastically risk-prone pool of defendants and attorneys."). See infra text accompanying notes
222-24.
145. Resnik, supra note 60, at 951-52 (habeas cases account for five percent of the federal
docket and "frivolous claims exist in all parts of the docket.").
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It should not be assumed that Justices or scholars analyze each
of these issues separately in deciding their views about habeas
corpus. It is quite possible that some of these issues are raised for
rhetorical reasons and really are just masks for other concerns. For
example, conservatives, believing that habeas allows for the release
of guilty defendants, may construct federalism arguments or ap-
peals to efficiency not because of genuine concern for the values of
federalism or efficiency, but rather as a way of achieving their goal
of restricting habeas corpus and keeping defendants in jail. Liber-
als, desiring to assure the protection of all constitutional rights, may
use a separation of powers argument not because of a belief in the
need for deference to Congress, but rather because it may support
more expansive habeas jurisdiction. Nonetheless, thinking about
the scope and availability of habeas corpus necessitates considera-
tion of these four issues.
III. THINKING ABOUT THE ISSUES: CONSIDERATIONS IN THE
DEBATE OVER THE PROPER SCOPE OF HABEAS
CORPUS REVIEW
Decisions regarding habeas corpus turn on the most basic and
most difficult questions in American society: how should power be
allocated between the federal and state governments?; what is the
appropriate division of powers between Congress and the federal
judiciary in constitutional cases?; what is the purpose of constitu-
tional rights in the criminal justice system?; how should society bal-
ance the tension between wanting an end to litigation and desiring
the opportunity for error correction? It is not surprising, therefore,
that even after 200 years of habeas corpus litigation there is still
disagreement as to even the most basic doctrinal questions. In fact,
because decisions about habeas implicate deep, underlying value
questions, it is quite likely that there never will be consensus as to
the proper scope of habeas. As the Court's membership changes,
and new Justices come on the bench with differing views on these
underlying issues, the habeas doctrines will also change. In light of
the scope and complexity of the underlying issues, I do not purport
to present a theory of habeas corpus. Rather, I merely wish to sug-
gest several considerations that should be taken into account as
each of the issues previously elaborated on are discussed and
debated.
1987]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
A. Federalism: When Should Federal Courts Review State Court
Judgments and Proceedings?
When analyzing federalism, it is important to clearly focus on
the proper issue. Frequently, critics of expansive habeas review ar-
gue that habeas is undesirable from a federalism perspective because
it creates tension between federal and state courts. Last term, for
example, the Supreme Court declared: "Federal habeas review cre-
ates friction between our state and federal courts, as state judges-
however able and thorough-know that their judgments may be set
aside by a single federal judge, years after it was entered and af-
firmed on direct appeal." '46 Commentators likewise invoke "fric-
tion" as a basis for opposing habeas review. Professor Bator
commented that habeas "creates a peculiarly abrasive and intrusive
relationship between the federal courts and the state courts, since it
subordinates the entire hierarchy of state tribunals to a single fed-
eral judge."' 47 In fact, concern over avoiding friction with state ju-
diciaries has been frequently mentioned by the Burger Court in
defining a number of federal court principles.'48
Yet, avoiding friction with state judiciaries deserves little weight
in defining the appropriate scope of habeas review. Although the
label "friction" is frequently invoked there is rarely any explanation
of what that friction is and or how it manifests itself. Apparently,
state judges are insulted by the fact that federal courts review their
decisions on habeas and are angry when their rulings are
overturned. '49
First, it must be recognized that the very existence of federal
courts, and of most federal jurisdiction, is based on a distrust of
state courts. Diversity jurisdiction, for instance, exists because of a
fear that state courts will be parochial and protect their own citi-
zens at the expense of out-of-staters.' 5 Removal jurisdiction, espe-
146. Kuhlman v. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. 2616, 2627 n.16 (1986). See also Isaac v. Engle, 456
U.S. 107, 128 (1981).
147. Bator, supra note 88, at 614; cf Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 991 (1985) (summarizing objection to habeas corpus on grounds that it offends state
judges).
148. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971) (federal courts may not enjoin
pending state court proceedings); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377-80 (1976) (dismissal of
challenge to police department practices, in part, on federalism grounds); Fair Assessment in
Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 109-10 (1981) (federal courts should not enjoin
state tax collection procedures).
149. For example, Justice O'Connor, in Engle v. Isaac, wrote that habeas review under-
mines the "morale" of state judges. Engle, 456 U.S. at 128 n.33.
150. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 24-25 (1985)
(discussing rationale underlying diversity jurisdiction).
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cially in the civil rights context, reflects a distrust of state courts.151
If state courts were identical to federal courts in their willingness to
uphold federal rights, federal courts would be unnecessary (at least
absent a theory that litigants with federal claims should have access
to a federal court-a position clearly rejected by those who oppose
broad habeas jurisdiction). I 2 Thus, what additional insult to state
courts does habeas corpus create in light of all of the "insult" that
is inherent in the existence of federal courts and federal jurisdiction?
Second, the assumption behind the friction argument is that
state court judges carefully follow the progress of their cases in fed-
eral court and hence are upset when their decisions are reversed.
Yet, I have seen no evidence for this assertion and, given the case
load of state court judges, it is unlikely that they have the time to
keep track of the ultimate disposition of most of their cases. In fact,
if it is assumed that state judges do follow federal habeas petitions,
then an argument could be made that habeas decreases friction be-
tween federal and state judges. In the vast majority of cases, federal
courts deny habeas petitions. One study found that habeas petitions
were granted in only 3.2% of all cases and only 1.8% resulted in
release of the petitioner. 153 Commentators agree that less than 5%
of all habeas petitions are granted. 154 Therefore, because federal
courts affirm state judges in over 95 percent of habeas petitions,
habeas review should serve as positive reinforcement for state courts
and not as a source of friction. 55
Third, it should be noted that the Burger Court's habeas doc-
trines risk even greater insult to state court judges. In Stone v. Pow-
ell, the Court held that state court defendants may only present
fourth amendment claims on habeas if they lacked a "full and fair"
opportunity to present their objection in state court.'5 6 As Profes-
151. The Civil Rights Removal Statute provides for removal by a person "who is denied
or cannot enforce [his or her equal rights] in the courts of such state." 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1)
(1982). This statute was expressly motivated by distrust of state courts. See W. WIECEK,
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL POWER-1863-1875, at 333, 338 (1969).
152. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103 (1980) (explicitly rejecting assertion that
"every person asserting a federal right is entitled to one unencumbered opportunity to litigate
that right in federal court.").
153. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: FEDERAL REVIEW OF STATE
HABEAS CORPUS 5 (1984), quoted in Resnik, supra note 60, at 952 n.523.
154. Resnik, supra note 60, at 952 n.523.
155. The argument in response would have to be that it is the existence of habeas review,
rather than the results, which creates friction. But it is hard to imagine why a process which
occurs years after the state court trial, is largely invisible to the state court judge, and usually
upholds the state court decision, would be so offensive.
156. Stone, 428 U.S. at 494.
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sor Resnik notes: "[I]n some sense, the state courts are at greater
risk under Stone v. Powell because it authorizes a broad inquiry into
the soundness of their procedures. The alternative question, of
whether a case was correctly decided, seems less intrusive."
1 57
Finally, and most importantly, what are the consequences of
friction between federal and state courts? The claim might be that
the friction will cause state judges to provide less protection for fed-
eral rights.158 If state judges do follow any habeas proceedings on
their decided cases and dislike being reversed, they would be careful
to protect constitutional rights to minimize the chances of being
overruled. 159
Even if federal courts create friction by reversing state court de-
cisions, correcting errors and protecting a wrongfully incarcerated
individual is more important than maintaining harmony between
levels of government. Federal court enforcement of constitutional
rights, such as in desegregation and reapportionment, frequently
causes friction between federal and state governments. Yet such
tensions are accepted as a cost of constitutional governance.
In considering the proper relationship between state and federal
courts in criminal cases, the issue is not friction, but rather, whether
state courts can be trusted to adequately protect constitutional
rights. As previously explained, determining the scope of habeas
jurisdiction for state prisoners inescapably requires a comparison of
the competence and vigilance of the two court systems in constitu-
tional cases. 160 Differing perspectives on whether there is parity be-
tween federal and state courts explains much of the difference
between the Warren and Burger Courts as well as conservative and
liberal commentators. 61
There are several excellent articles citing reasons for the lack of
parity between federal and state courts and explaining the need for
a federal forum to protect constitutional rights.' 62  Detailed re-
157. Resnik, supra note 60, at 886 n.157.
158. Cf Bator, supra note 88, at 626 (habeas corpus as disincentive to good decisionmak-
ing in state courts).
159. Cover & Alienikoff, supra note 115, at 1046 ("If state courts knew that errors would
be corrected by a federal court requiring a retrial, they might be more solicitous toward
[federal] claims brought before them.").
160. See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 80-90.
162. See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 80, at 1105-06:
The assumption of parity is, at best, a dangerous myth, fostering federal forum
allocation decisions which channel constitutional adjudication under the illusion
that state courts will vindicate federally secured constitutional rights as forcefully as
would lower federal courts. At worst, it provides a pretext for funneling federal
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sponses argue that state courts are to be trusted in applying consti-
tutional criminal procedure protections. 6 3 My objective is to offer
several observations about the dispute, not resolve it.
It must be recognized that the question of parity is an empirical
issue: what is the difference between federal and state courts in de-
ciding constitutional issues, and which court system is "better" in
resolving such claims? Yet, for methodological reasons it is un-
likely that there ever will be empirical data to resolve the ques-
tion."6 There would need to be some measure for comparing the
courts, and criteria for defining a superior court for protecting con-
stitutional rights. Unless federal and state courts are presented with
identical cases, it is difficult to assess whether differences in out-
comes reflect variance in the forum, the issues, or the types of
cases. 65 Additionally, in a country with fifty state court systems, it
is likely that some state courts are superior to federal courts in pro-
tecting federal rights, and in some states they are inferior to the
federal judiciary. The courts will probably vary depending on the
particular issue; a state court might be superior in upholding federal
rights in some areas and inferior in others. However, an aggregate
study concluding that there is or is not parity would still not reveal
all of the instances of disparity between the court systems.
Commentators arguing that there is no parity attempt to avoid
the empirical question by pointing to historical evidence of state
court hostility towards federal rights.I6 6 Although there still would
need to be some measure of comparing the historical practices of
state courts and federal courts, more importantly, there would need
constitutional decision-making into state courts precisely because they are less likely
to be receptive to vigorous enforcement of federal constitutional doctrine.
Id.; See also Peller, supra note 28, at 666-68.
163. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 28, at 451-52; Bator, supra note 88, at 610-11; Solimine &
Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judi-
cial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CON T. L.Q. 213, 214 (1983) (state courts are no more hostile than
federal courts to the protection of federal rights).
164. See Neuborne, supra note 80, at 1116 n.46 ("No comparative study of the relative
performance of state and federal courts in the enforcement of constitutional rights appears to
exist."). But see supra note 163 and infra note 165.
165. For example, Solimine and Walker examine federal and state courts in constitutional
cases and conclude that there is no difference in the performance of the two court systems.
Solimine & Walker, supra note 163, at 214-15. Yet, this conclusion ignores methodological
problems of self-selection. Litigants chose the state courts over the federal courts and those
were the cases where they perceived the greatest chance of a favorable state court decision.
166. Neuborne, supra note 80, at 1111-15. See also Beatty, State Court Evasion of United
States Supreme Court Mandates During the Last Decade of the Warren Court, 6 VAL. U.L.
REv. 260 (1972); Schneider, State Court Evasions of United States Supreme Court Mandates.
7 VAL. U.L. Rrv. 191 (1973); Amsterdam, supra note 105, at 802.
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to be evidence that the disparity continues. Especially with the
large number of conservative judges appointed by the Reagan ad-
ministration, it cannot be assumed that the federal judiciary neces-
sarily will be more aggressive than state courts in protecting
constitutional rights in the future.
Another way in which commentators attempt to avoid the em-
pirical question of parity is to focus on the structural differences
between federal and state courts. The argument raised is that be-
cause federal judges are insulated from direct electoral accountabil-
ity (they have life tenure and their salaries cannot be decreased),
they are more disposed to apply and uphold the Constitution.167
Even though state court bias against constitutional rights cannot be
empirically proven, there is a "reasoned institutional justification"
for believing that there is prejudice.168 Professor Yackle, for exam-
ple, argues:
The need for federal habeas has not subsided. State judges, who
must stand periodic election.., cannot be as zealous in the pro-
tection of constitutional rights as life-tenured federal judges....
State judges act at their peril when they subordinate societal in-
terests in convicting the guilty to the defendant's interests in pro-
cedural safeguards. 169
Although this argument is frequently made,' 7 ° the problem is
that there is no way to persuade those who disagree and believe that
these institutional differences do not affect decisionmaking and that
state courts are as effective as federal courts in protecting constitu-
tional rights. It is all a matter of opinion; either one believes the
insulation of federal judges makes them more likely to uphold indi-
vidual liberties or one believes that there is no real difference be-
tween the court systems. Absent empirical evidence there is little
basis for dialogue or persuasion.
There are, however, several ways in which the dispute over par-
ity might be resolved in the absence of empirical studies. For exam-
ple, it might be argued that there is no reason for the Supreme
Court to evaluate the comparative competence of federal and state
courts; that the question of parity is one for Congress to resolve.
The notion is that since it is for Congress to determine the jurisdic-
tion of the lower federal courts,' 7 ' and to decide questions of feder-
167. Peller, supra note 28, at 682; Neuborne, supra note 80, at 1122-29.
168. Peller, supra note 28, at 681.
169. Yackle, supra note 8, at 616.
170. See, e.g., Cover & Alienikoff, supra note 115, at 1050-51; Neuborne, supra note 80,
at 1105; Amsterdam, supra note 105, at 802.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
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alism,'7 2 the Supreme Court should allow Congress to resolve the
parity issue. The relevant inquiry would be, in enacting the habeas
statutes, what were Congress' views as to the willingness of state
courts to protect federal rights?
Phrased in this way, there is a clear answer. There appears to be
no disagreement that Congress was motivated to allow state prison-
ers access to federal courts precisely because they greatly distrusted
state courts. 17 3 As the Supreme Court recently observed, "there
can be no doubt that in enacting § 2254, Congress sought to inter-
pose the federal courts between the states and the people, as guardi-
ans of the people's federal rights-to protect the people from
unconstitutional action."174 Accordingly, if the Court is to follow
congressional views as to parity, the Court should interpret habeas
statutes based on the assumption that state courts are to be dis-
trusted. If subsequent developments render this premise outdated,
then it would be for Congress to change its directive by modifying
the underlying statute.
This approach to the parity question has its obvious attractions
because it makes unnecessary any Supreme Court confrontation
with the empirical question of whether state courts are inferior to
federal courts in protecting federal rights. Even so, the question of
parity might not be permanently put to rest. If Congress chose to
greatly restrict federal jurisdiction, such as by completely eliminat-
ing habeas cases, the court would need to decide whether such legis-
lation was constitutional. This determination would depend, in
part, on the likely effect of the statute, which would in turn entail
some assessment of the forseeable conduct of state courts and the
question of parity.
An alternative way to avoid the parity question would be to ar-
gue that litigants presenting constitutional claims should have the
opportunity to litigate in the forum of their choice. Society should
strive for the maximum protection of constitutional rights and liti-
gants are in the best position to decide what court will best protect
their rights. Therefore, a defendant with a constitutional claim
should be able to choose whether to present the issue to a federal or
a state court.' 75 In state criminal cases where the defendant has no
choice of forum, the defendant should be allowed to later litigate
constitutional claims in federal court if he or she wishes to do so.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
173. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 102, at 840; Neuborne, supra note 80, at I 11.
174. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
175. For an elaboration of such a proposal, see Yackle, supra note 147.
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Such an approach advances the value of litigant autonomy and be-
cause the defendant chooses the forum it is likely to enhance the
legitimacy of the court's decision.' 76
Professor Bator challenges this position by arguing: "Why
should it be the plaintiff's choice which is decisive? What about the
preference of the defendant?... The argument simply assumes that
the forum the plaintiff is likely to choose is also the preferable fo-
rum from some neutral constitutional perspective."'177 The re-
sponse is that in criminal cases where the parties are an individual
with a constitutional claim and the government as prosecutor, the
individual should choose the forum which would provide the maxi-
mum chance for upholding constitutional rights. The issue, then, in
appraising this approach to the parity question is whether it is desir-
able to maximize protection of constitutional rights. For example,
the Burger Court in Stone v. Powell prevented relitigation on habeas
of fourth amendment exclusionary rule claims precisely because it
did not want to maximize federal court reversals on that basis.' 78
In application, this would cause the parity question to turn on the
third issue discussed above; what is the function of constitutional
rights in the criminal justice system? Should the Court maximize
the protection of all rights or only those that relate to guilt or
innocence?
Additionally, absent a mechanism whereby state defendants
could remove their cases to federal court if they have a constitu-
tional claim, it must be admitted that a litigant autonomy model
would permit all prisoners raising constitutional issues access to the
federal courts. Any state court defendant who lost would simply
assert that he or she preferred a federal forum to adjudicate the
constitutional claims and thereby gain access to the federal judici-
ary on habeas corpus.
A final way to avoid the parity question would be to argue that
"jurisdictional redundancy" between federal courts is desirable, re-
gardless of which court is better or worse. 179 The argument is that
it is desirable to have another court, with a potentially different in-
stitutional perspective, review the case. As discussed above, Profes-
sor Cover argues that jurisdictional redundancy serves the purposes
of error correction, preventing one ideology from dominating deci-
176. For a discussion of the value of litigant autonomy in the court system. see Resnik.
supra note 60, at 845-47.
177. Bator, supra note 88, at 608 n. 11.
178. Stone, 428 U.S. at 482-90.
179. Cover, supra note 131, at 649-73.
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sionmaking, and innovation. I "° This argument inevitably collapses
into the fourth issue: how are these benefits to revisions balanced
against the costs of disrupting finality? Additional judicial proce-
dures always have benefits and might correct mistakes, but the
question is whether they are worth the costs. The greater the differ-
ence between the forums- the less there is parity-the more bene-
fits there are to redundancy. But even if parity is assumed, there
still are independent benefits to allowing relitigation on habeas
corpus.
The question of parity is central to defining federal jurisdiction
in a wide variety of areas. 81 A thorough discussion and explora-
tion in the context of habeas corpus would potentially provide great
benefits in defining the proper role for the federal courts. At the
very least, the discussion can advance beyond the point where there
are two sides asserting positions; one that federal courts are supe-
rior, and the other that state courts are equal to federal courts in
their ability and willingness to protect constitutional rights.
B. Separation of Powers: Is it for Congress to Decide the Scope
of Habeas Corpus and, If So, What Was Congressional
Intent in Adopting the Habeas Corpus
Statutes?
Earlier, I reviewed the arguments as to why it is for Congress to
define the availability of habeas corpus for state prisoners: Congress
has the power to determine the jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts and Congress can decide the proper allocation of power be-
tween the federal and state governments.182 Additionally, I consid-
ered the objection, that carried to its extreme, this position would
seemingly authorize Congress to eliminate habeas corpus in the fed-
eral courts, unconstitutionally suspending the writ of habeas
corpus.183
The current habeas statutes are the basis for federal court relief
for state prisoners and there is no claim that they are unconstitu-
tional. In addressing their meaning, there is a strong case to be
made that all issues concerning the scope of habeas review are to be
decided as statutory questions in accord with traditional principles
of construction. The problem is that neither the text of the provi-
sions nor the legislative history deal with the particular issues facing
180. See supra text accompanying notes 140-45.
181. See Neuborne, supra note 80, at 1105.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 92-97.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
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the Supreme Court: when may a state court defendant relitigate
matters in federal court that have been decided in state court, and
when may a matter be raised on habeas that was not presented at
trial?
Nonetheless, commentators have attempted to support their po-
sitions with legislative history. After examining the earlier cases
and the contemporaneous understanding of habeas corpus at the
time the Reconstruction Act was adopted, Professor Paul Bator
concluded that the statute was not meant to permit relitigation of
habeas claims.' 84 He argued that the drafters only intended to al-
low habeas relief when the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction. 85
Professor Gary Peller, by contrast, reviewed each of the cases dis-
cussed by Professor Bator and the legislative history surrounding
the adoption of the Habeas Act of 1867, and concluded that Con-
gress did intend to allow relitigation of constitutional claims on
habeas corpus.186
I have nothing to add to these competing views of the legislative
history, but wish to suggest a few additional considerations for in-
terpreting the habeas statutes. First, the real question is, how
should the statute be adopted given uncertainty as to intent? It
would seem that the best approach is to follow the literal language
of the statute and place the burden of proof on the shoulders of
those who argue that the statute should have less reach than its
apparent intended meaning.
Section 2254 expressly allows a federal court to grant habeas
corpus to individuals who claim that their custody is "in violation
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 87 The
text of the statute is thus a broad authorization for federal courts to
grant relief to individuals who demonstrate that they were con-
victed due to a constitutional violation. The statute does not limit
petitions to claims that were presented at trial, nor does it preclude
relitigation of matters that were decided in state court. Congress
certainly could have included such limitations in the statute or
could amend the statute to create such requirements. '88 Therefore,
in deciding between competing interpretations of legislative history,
the burden of proof must be on the side of those who advocate limit-
184. Bator, supra note 28, at 466-77.
185. Id. at 466.
186. Peller, supra note 28, at 610-19.
187. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982).
188. The statute does contain a requirement that prisoners exhaust their state remedies
before presenting habeas claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1982).
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ing the authority granted by the literal language of the statute. Un-
less a compelling case can be made that there was congressional
intent to the contrary, federal courts should be able to provide relief
to all prisoners who claim that they are held in violation of the Con-
stitution or laws of the United States.
Second, if there is doubt as to Congress' intent as to specific
interpretive questions, uncertainty should be resolved by reference
to the clearer general objectives of the law. Although there is disa-
greement over particular issues, there seems to be universal agree-
ment that Congress, in enacting the Reconstruction Act, feared
state court disregard of constitutional rights. 89 As such, the statute
should be interpreted in accord with this general Congressional in-
tent -habeas corpus as protection of constitutional rights in light
of strong distrust of state courts-until Congress chooses to amend
the statute and give the Court other directions.
Finally, in resolving the disagreement over the meaning of the
statute, consideration must be given to the meaning of Congress'
failure to revise the statute. Actually, Congress did revise the
habeas statute in 1966 in response to Supreme Court interpretation.
In Townsend v. Sain, the Supreme Court held that the federal
courts, in hearing habeas petitions, have broad authority to reliti-
gate facts pertaining to constitutional claims.190 Congress then
amended section 2254(d) to specify the circumstances under which
federal courts may retry factual issues191
An argument can be made that Congress' failure to amend the
habeas statute after Brown v. Allen 92 and Fay v. Noia 193 demon-
strated implicit congressional acquiescence to these decisions and
hence it was wrong for the Court to limit or reverse them in the
absence of congressional action. However, does this mean that
Congress' failure to revise the statute after decisions such as Stone v.
Powel11 and Wainwright v. Sykes '9 5 is also acquiescence to them
and the Court may not revise them until Congress acts? Moreover,
the Court, at times, does change its interpretation of statutes
189. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 105, at 818, 828-42; Peller, supra note 28, at 619;
Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 373-76.
190. 372 U.S. 293, 310-12 (1963). See also Wright & Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners: The Allocation of Fact-Finding Responsibility, 75 YALE L.J. 895, 958-79
(1966).
191. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982).
192. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
193. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
194. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
195. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
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notwithstanding the nonintervention of Congress.1 96 Nonetheless,
if habeas jurisdiction is viewed as a statutory question, the issue
which must be confronted is how to treat congressional silence in
light of varying judicial interpretations.
C. What is the Purpose of Constitutional Rights in the Criminal
Justice System?
In an influential article, Judge Henry Friendly argued that
habeas only should be available when there is a "colorable showing
of innocence."' 97 As discussed earlier, this view not only underlies
the Burger Court's approach to habeas corpus, but also its general
orientation to criminal procedure issues.198 Diametrically opposed
to this position are those Supreme Court Justices and commentators
who believe that habeas corpus should exist to remedy all constitu-
tional violations; that constitutional rights exist to serve functions
beyond protection of the innocent. 199 Again, I am not going to at-
tempt to resolve this fundamental disagreement, but rather, I want
to suggest several factors that should be taken into consideration
when confronting this issue.
First, those who argue that habeas corpus should be limited to
those who make a colorable showing of innocence must demon-
strate that it is possible to determine what habeas petitions to hear
on the basis of the pleadings. Simply put, what must a defendant
allege in order to offer a sufficient showing of possible innocence to
justify habeas corpus review under this approach?2" If the petition
itself must demonstrate possible innocence, even an innocent indi-
vidual may not be able to allege sufficient facts to persuade the court
to hear a habeas petition. The record of the state proceedings may
not contain the information needed to establish a claim that the de-
fendant is innocent. In fact, it was because of perceived inadequa-
cies in state fact finding processes and in the records of state
196. See, e.g., Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), rev'd in part
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
197. Friendly, supra note 9, at 160.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 108-27.
199. Id.
200. Hill, The Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Cases, 78 COLUM. L. REV.
1050, 1076-77 n.158 (1978) (suggesting that such a requirement would be inappropriate in
situations where the prisoner lacked a fair opportunity to present his constitutional claim.
Furthermore, even in situations where there was a fair opportunity given to the prisoner, the
author suggests that the "colorable claim" requirement might be inappropriate, because con-
stitutional claims can be made which do not bear on the actual guilt or innocence of the
prisoner).
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proceedings that the Supreme Court decided to take advantage of
the powers granted by congressional creation of habeas corpus re-
view.2"1 Professor Meador explains that the Court was explicitly
aware of "the inadequacy of many state records" and therefore pro-
vided a "federal forum in which the evidentiary record concerning
the alleged violation could be fully developed. '20 2
If a defendant could obtain habeas review merely by including a
statement that he or she is really innocent, every defendant would
do so and the intended limitation of habeas jurisdiction would
fail.20 3 On the other hand, if the courts were to require a showing
of arguable innocence in order to have a habeas petition heard, de-
fendants might find access to the federal courts blocked because of
deficiencies in the trial record. In fact, the constitutional objection
might relate specifically to the exclusion of evidence offered by the
defendant to established his or her innocence. In other words, to
demonstrate innocence a defendant would need to have a hearing to
elicit and produce the necessary evidence. But in order to get the
hearing, the defendant would first need to establish innocence. By
requiring a showing of likely innocence in order to present a habeas
petition, a catch 22 is created, in that a defendant would need to
persuade the court of the likely outcome on the merits in order to
invoke the court's jurisdiction.
Additionally, creating substantial pleading requirements poses a
special problem in the context of habeas cases because of the large
number of petitions that are filed pro se.2" It is quite possible that
even an actually innocent pro se defendant would not draft the
pleadings with sufficient persuasiveness to convince the reviewing
court that there was a high enough probability of innocence to jus-
tify hearing the habeas petition.
Second, those who argue that criminal procedure protections
should be limited to protecting the innocent must explain the exist-
ence of numerous constitutional provisions that seem unrelated to
201. Meador, Straightening Out Federal Review of State Criminal Cases, 44 OHIO ST. L.J.
272, 274 (1983) ("Not surprisingly, the state criminal process was not always attuned to a full
development of such facts; nor were state judges always oriented to making the sort of de-
tailed factual findings that would permit meaningful Supreme Court review on direct
appeal.").
202. Id.
203. Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 HARV. L. REV. 321,
371 (1973) (prisoners would allege innocence as a matter of course, so judicial scrutiny would
still be required).
204. Resnik, supra note 60, at 950 (most habeas petitions are filed pro se and often leave
out important information).
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guilt or innocence. For example, as the Supreme Court itself noted
in Stone, the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
search and seizure does not pertain to the accuracy of the evidence
obtained."0 5 Instead, it seems oriented to protecting individual pri-
vacy from unwarranted governmental intrusion.20 6 To the extent
that the fifth amendment's protection against self-incrimination is
more than an assurance of voluntariness, it, too, serves values other
than protecting innocent defendants. Other provisions, such as a
right to a speedy trial, protection against unreasonable bail, and the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments, also seem to
serve values other than accurate determination of guilt or inno-
cence. Considering all of these provisions, it appears unrealistic to
limit habeas corpus protection to those who can make an arguable
claim of innocence.
Those who advocate limiting habeas corpus might argue that
while these constitutional rights are important, they are adequately
protected via the appeals process. Habeas corpus exists for truly
important cases: those rare instances in which an arguably innocent
person is incarcerated. 2 7 The problem with this view is that there
is no apparent authority for it in any of the statutory provisions or
their history. As Professor Seidman noted: "There is no evidence
at all to suggest that the Framers meant [habeas corpus] availability
to turn on the defendant's guilt or innocence. ' 20 8 Because federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction is largely a statutory question and the
statute does not limit habeas corpus to those defendants who
demonstrate their arguable innocence, it would be inappropriate for
the Court to independently add such a jurisdictional limitation. 0 9
Thus, even without confronting the basic question of whether
criminal procedure protections should exist solely to protect the in-
nocent, several questions must be addressed by those who want to
restrict the availability of habeas corpus to defendants with a color-
able claim of innocence.
205. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 428, 482-89 (1976).
206. Id. See, e.g., Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 353 (1974) ("The Bill of Rights in general and the fourth amendment in particular are
profoundly anti-government documents.").
207. This seems the core of Judge Friendly's position. Friendly, supra note 9, at 142-43.
208. Seidman, supra note 10, at 457 n.126.
209. See generally Redish, supra note 30 (criticizing judicial limitations on congressional
grants of jurisdiction).
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D. The Role of Collateral Review and The Tension Between
Finality and Revisions
As discussed earlier, habeas corpus presents a tension between
the desire for finality, an end to the proceedings, and a desire to
provide the chance for revisions, especially to correct errors. t ° In
thinking about this conflict, it is essential to remember that what is
being sought is a balance between these two objectives. There obvi-
ously must be finality at some point; a time when the defendant has
had sufficient opportunities for review and the chances of finding an
error are too remote to justify further expenditure of resources.2 '
Yet, there must also be opportunities for revision and error correc-
tion. Criminal punishments, incarceration and even death, are so
severe that mistakes "whether defined as convictions of innocents or
convictions based on substantial constitutional violations" are
intolerable."' 2
Therefore, it simply will not suffice to argue for restricting
habeas corpus by pointing to the fact that it disrupts finality.2" 3 The
question must be whether the benefits of possible revision outweigh
the costs of sacrificing finality.
Again, my intent is not to suggest the proper balance, but rather
to try and clarify what it is that is being balanced. First, it is impor-
tant to brush aside several misleading arguments that frequently are
part of the balancing analysis. For example, the Court and com-
mentators continue to say that habeas is undesirable because it un-
dermines the deterrent function of the criminal law.2" 4 Yet, no
evidence for this assertion is ever offered. So few prisoners have had
their convictions overturned on habeas that it is incredibly unlikely
that habeas can be accused of decreasing the certainty of punish-
ment. Professor Resnik's careful review of the statistics concerning
210. See supra text accompanying notes 128-45.
211. See Resnik, supra note 60, at 854-55 ("Practically, both the system and the litigants
must be able to turn attention and energies elsewhere. Psychologically, there is a need for
repose. Politically, there is a belief that state intervention in individuals' lives should gener-
ally come to an end.").
212. Even the most ardent advocates for limiting habeas corpus recognize that finality
must at times give way to error correction. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 28, at 446-48;
Friendly, supra note 9, at 149-50.
213. The Supreme Court has emphasized that one of the major costs of habeas corpus is
that "it undermines the usual principles of finality of litigation." Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S.
107, 127 (1982).
214. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. 2616 (1986); Friendly, supra note 9, at 146. "It is
essential to the educational and deterrent functions of the criminal law that we be able to say
that one violating the law will swiftly and certainly become subject to punishment." Id.
(quoting Bator, supra note 28, at 452). See also Bator, supra note 88, at 614.
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habeas petitions revealed that 2.68% of prisoners file habeas peti-
tions and that less than five percent of these have their habeas peti-
tions granted.21 5 One study suggests that less than two percent of
habeas petitioners are actually released from custody as a result of
federal court review.216
Deterrence is a function of the certainty and the severity of the
punishment imposed.217 The certainty of punishment includes the
likelihood of being apprehended, the chance of being convicted, and
the probability of a sentence being imposed. The fact that one in a
thousand prisoners succeeds in gaining a reversal of a conviction on
habeas hardly seems likely to have any effect on the deterrence of
crime.
Likewise, it is wrong to oppose habeas on the grounds that it
prevents effective rehabilitation of prisoners. Although this argu-
ment is frequently made,21 8 it assumes that prisons do have a reha-
bilitative effect and that the possibility of collateral relief
undermines that result. Yet, if there is anything in the criminal jus-
tice system about which there is widespread consensus, it is that
prisons do not rehabilitate.219 Furthermore, the relationship be-
tween rehabilitation and the remote chances of release on habeas
seems very tenuous.
Finally, and most importantly, concerns about attorney's
sandbagging arguments have been given far too much weight in de-
cisions and discussions concerning the scope of habeas review. The
Supreme Court repeatedly has emphasized the need to enforce pro-
cedural defaults and uphold finalilty so as to prevent the sandbag-
ging of arguments for later presentation on habeas corpus.22° First,
concern for sandbagging does not justify enforcing procedural de-
faults that are the result of attorney inadvertence 221 or an attorney's
215. Resnik, supra note 60, at 952 n.523, 955.
216. Id. at 952 n.523 (citing to BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT:
FEDERAL REVIEW OF STATE HABEAS CORPUS 5 (1984)).
217. See A. DERSHOWiTZ, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 3 (1976); N. MORRIS & G.
HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL 255-61 (1970); F. ZIM-
RING, PERSPECTIVES ON DETERRENCE 1-2 (1971).
218. Kuhhnann, 106 S. Ct. at 2626; Bator, supra note 88.
219. See, e.g., AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A
REPORT ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 34-47 (1971) (explaining reasons why
rehabilitation should not be a goal of the criminal justice system).
220. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89 (1977); United States v. Fady, 456
U.S. 152, 160-61 (1982); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 (1982).
221. See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2648 (1986) ("Attorney error short of
ineffective assistance of counsel does not constitute cause for a procedural default."); Smith v.
Murray, 106 S. Ct. 2661, 2667 (1986) (fact that counsel did not recognize the factual or legal
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failure to anticipate future court decisions creating rights that were
not in existence at the time of trial.2 ' Second, it is difficult to see
what an attorney may gain by sandbagging. If the objection is
presented at trial, there is a chance that the court will rule in the
defendant's favor and that this ruling will aid in gaining an acquit-
tal. If the court rules against the defendant, the objection is pre-
served and can be raised on appeal and later on habeas. If the
objection is sandbagged for habeas, the defendant is giving up its
use at trial and on appeal, for no apparent gain. In fact, under the
Fay v. Noia standard, 23 the objection could not even be presented
on habeas corpus if it could be shown that the defendant deliber-
ately bypassed review in state proceedings. Furthermore, given the
low rate of success on habeas, it is hard to imagine attorneys strate-
gically choosing to wait and take the chance at a possible later re-
versal.2 24 Third, a blanket rule enforcing virtually all procedural
defaults assumes that they are more likely to result from deliberate
sandbagging rather than from attorney error. Yet, the reality of
criminal representation, especially by often over-worked public de-
fenders, is quite the contrary.
Thus, concern for finality should not be on account of increasing
deterrence or rehabilitation, or decreasing the likelihood of
sandbagging. When these arguments are brushed aside, it becomes
clear that the real basis for the concern over finality-besides
preventing the release of guilty individuals as discussed above-is a
desire to conserve judicial resources."2 5 The question becomes
whether habeas petitions are worth their costs. In order to answer
this question, it is essential to carefully calculate the exact costs.
After a thorough review of the docket of the federal courts, Profes-
sor Resnik estimates that approximately five percent of the federal
courts' civil docket is comprised of habeas petitions.226 Professor
Resnik points out that such cases might actually occupy a greater
basis for a claim, or failed to raise the claim even though recognizing it, is not cause for a
procedural default).
222. See, e.g., Engle, 456 U.S. at 107.
223. Fay, 372 U.S. at 438.
224. Resnik, supra note 60, at 897 (the sandbagging "argument assumes a fantastically
risk-prone pool of defendants and attorneys. Given that the success rate at trial and on ap-
peal, while low, is greater than the success rate on habeas corpus, the odds are against being
able to sandbag in a first procedure and emerge victorious in a second.").
225. Friendly, supra note 9 (habeas as a drain on judicial resources); Bator, supra note 88,
at 624.
226. Resnik, supra note 60, at 950. Approximately ten percent of the docket consists of
cases filed by prisoners where civil rights claims and habeas petitions are combined. Id. at
953.
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percentage of judicial time because of the fact that so many of the
litigants appear pro se and of the minimal likelihood of
settlement.227
Are these costs in judicial time justified by the benefits of collat-
eral review? This is the central question in deciding the proper bal-
ance between the desires for finality and revisions. To a large
extent, the answer may be derived from information gained in ana-
lyzing the other three issues. For example, the greater the distrust
in state courts, the more reason to believe that federal courts will
correct errors on habeas corpus. 228 The more substantial the per-
ceived differences between federal and state courts-the less there is
a belief in parity-the more important it is to have the opportunity
for federal court review.
It can be argued that it is for Congress, and not the Supreme
Court, to decide what level of expenditures are justified on habeas
corpus. In addition to the arguments already presented as to why
Congress should determine the jurisdiction of the federal courts in
habeas cases, a strong argument can be made that it is for the legis-
lature, with control over taxing and spending, to make resource al-
location decisions. Congress could decide if the relative infrequency
of habeas petitions makes them unworthy of the costs; or whether
the enormous importance of releasing wrongfully incarcerated indi-
viduals justifies the expenditures on federal court review.22 9 Fur-
thermore, the extent to which revisions are desirable depends, in
part, on one's view of the role of constitutional rights in the crimi-
nal justice system. At a minimum, society should spend additional
resources for those with a colorable claim of innocence. But those
who believe that habeas should extend to all constitutional claims
further argue that virtually nothing is more deserving of resources
than assuring that no person is incarcerated as a result of a constitu-
tional violation. My central point is, however, that the balancing
should be done openly and explicitly, and that care should be taken
to be sure that irrelevant considerations are excluded.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although there are dozens of Supreme Court decisions and law
review articles examining habeas corpus, the controversy over the
proper scope of habeas review shows no signs of abating. In fact,
227. Id. at 950.
228. Cover, supra note 131, at 667-69.
229. Resnik, supra note 60, at 956.
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there is no doubt that if there is a quad-centennial celebration of the
Constitution in 200 more years, there will still be dispute over the
appropriate role of habeas in the American criminal justice system.
The limited purpose of this Article is to clarify the agenda for de-
bate and offer some suggestions as to how the dialogue should
proceed.
